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Introduction
One important element of life-cycle models of consumption and saving is the process of how individuals form and revise beliefs about their life expectancy when they grow older. In line with Muth's (1961) rational expectations paradigm it is common in the literature to consider expected utility maximizing agents whose updated subjective beliefs coincide with objective conditional survival probabilities. Only recently, researchers have focused on subjective assessments of survival probabilities which deviate from projected lifetable survival rates on the aggregate level.
1 According to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), on average, younger people strongly underestimate their (relatively high) probability to survive to some target age. At the same time older people strongly overestimate their lower survival probability. Such patterns can neither be reconciled with the rational expectations paradigm nor with models of rational Bayesian learning according to which subjective beliefs converge to objective probabilities when people gain more experience, i.e., grow older. In addition, recent empirical …ndings on household saving behavior proved to be puzzling for the standard "workhorse"-life-cycle model à la Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Ando and Modigliani (1963) which assumes rational agents with perfect foresight throughout their life. For example, Laibson et al. (1998) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007) report large gaps between self-reported behavior and self-reported plans and/or preferences. Generally, people save less for retirement than actually planned (Choi et al. 2006) . Such phenomena of dynamic inconsistency have been analyzed within models of hyperbolic time-discounting and bounded self-control. Building on the early work by Strotz (1955) and Pollak (1968) , Laibson et al. (1998) …nd that exponential consumers save more than hyperbolic consumers. Besides these tendencies for undersaving and dynamically inconsistent behavior a well-known puzzle within the standard life-cycle framework is that people hold large amounts of assets still late in life and dissave less at the end of their life than predicted by the standard model (see, e.g., De Nardi et al. 2010; Hurd and Rohwedder 2010; Lockwood 2013) . This paper investigates in how far the aforementioned mistakes about assessing the prospect of survival may explain these empirical …ndings on saving behavior. To this purpose we merge a model of subjective survival belief formation with an otherwise standard life-cycle model. To model biases in survival beliefs as reported in the HRS, we adopt a simpli…ed version of the Bayesian learning model under ambiguity developed by Ludwig and Zimper (2013) . Agents of this learning model are decision makers whose preferences can be represented by Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory (Schmeidler 1989; Gilboa 1987) or, equivalently, by cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker and Tversky 1993) . 2 More speci…cally, we model ambiguous survival beliefs as non-additive probabilities in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) which take individuals' psychological attitudes into account; notably ambiguity with respect to objective survival probabilities and a degree of relative optimism with which this ambiguity is resolved. Because we derive updated survival beliefs from a model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity, our model goes beyond a mere static application of CPT or CEU theory to survival beliefs as, e.g., in Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006) and in Halevy (2008) . In contrast to these ad hoc CPT models, which …x a unique probability weighting function, our axiomatic approach towards Bayesian updating of CEU preferences 3 gives rise to a sequence of age-dependent probability weighting functions when we transform objective survival probabilities into subjective beliefs. Based on our dynamic model of ambiguous survival beliefs, we use an otherwise standard stochastic life-cycle consumption model to compare the consumption and saving behavior of CEU agents with rational expectations (RE) agents who are nested within our approach as a special case. Whenever CEU agents do not reduce to RE agents, our life-cycle maximization problem gives rise to dynamically inconsistent behavior. We restrict attention to 'naive'agents. In contrast to a 'sophisticated'agent, who is fully aware of her dynamically inconsistent behavior, a naive agent does not anticipate that her future-selves have strict incentives to deviate from her ex ante optimal consumption plan. To consider naive rather than sophisticated agents is in line with empirical evidence that supports the relevance of the former (cf. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and the literature cited therein).
Qualitative analysis for a simple three-period life-cycle model-relegated to the supplementary Appendix C-shows that naive CEU agents exhibit undersaving behavior relative to their RE counterparts if they su¢ ciently underestimate objective survival probabilities at young ages. Furthermore, at older ages they need to moderately overestimate their survival chances in order to save less than originally planned. Finally, CEU agents save more out of cash on hand in the intermediate model period than the corresponding RE agent. However, whether asset holdings in the …nal period are higher for the CEU agent depends on the interplay between underestimation at younger ages and overestimation at older ages. Whether these conditions hold and how relevant the biases in beliefs are for generating saving puzzles are quantitative questions.
To address these quantitative questions we calibrate the stochastic quantitative lifecycle model to the data. At this stage, the strength of our structural survival beliefs model comes into play because it allows us to characterize the entire survival beliefs distribution while there are only speci…c data points available from the HRS. We …nd that underestimation of survival probabilities at younger ages leads to undersaving for retirement and that dynamic inconsistency implies lower savings than originally planned. Moreover, due to the overestimation of survival probabilities at older ages, CEU agents decumulate assets at lower rates and eventually exhibit higher asset holdings than their RE counterparts. Our quantitative …ndings can be compressed in the following numbers: CEU agents with ambiguous survival beliefs at working age have a saving rate of 21:9% on average compared to a rational expectations model with an average saving rate of 22:8%. The realized saving rate is 2:8 percentage points lower than what the CEU agent at age 20 actually planned to save. Our model predicts average asset holdings at age 85 (95) of 46:4% (23:5%) of the assets at age 65 which is 11:5 (15:8) percentage points higher than respective values for rational agents.
These …ndings support our modeling approach. However, there still exists a gap between model-generated and empirical saving rates and asset holdings (cf. our discussion in Sections 5.3-5.4). Of course, this does not come as a surprise because it is implausible that a stylized model of ambiguous survival beliefs alone can fully explain people's life-cycle decisions.
Finally, observe that the standard explanation for time inconsistency and undersaving at young ages in the form of hyperbolic time discounting models (Laibson et al. 1998; Angeletos et al. 2001) cannot account for high old-age asset holdings. Similar, the standard explanations for insu¢ cient asset decumulation at old ages in the form of bequest (Hurd 1989; Lockwood 2013) and precautionary savings motives (Palumbo 1999; De Nardi et al. 2010 ) alone cannot explain undersaving at young ages. Our model of ambiguous survival beliefs adds to these existing explanations whereby it simultaneously generates all three stylized …ndings; namely, (i) time inconsistency of agents, (ii) undersaving at younger ages and (iii) high asset holdings at old age.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and presents our …rst building block, a parsimonious model of ambiguous survival beliefs. In Section 3 we combine this model with a quantitative multi-period stochastic life-cycle model. Calibration is outlined in Section 4 and results of the quantitative analysis are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes our analysis. Appendix A recalls formal de…ni-tions from Choquet decision theory. Appendix B sketches the construction of ambiguous survival beliefs through a model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity by Ludwig and Zimper (2013) . Supplementary Appendix C contains the analytical three-period model.
Ambiguous Survival Beliefs

Biases in Survival Beliefs
As point of departure, consider the subjective survival beliefs elicited in the Health and Retirement study (HRS) . Respondents are asked about their assessment of the probability to survive from some interview age up to a speci…c target age. Target age is mostly 10 to 15 years in advance, see Table 1 . Figure 1 shows aggregated data from the HRS by plotting average age-speci…c biases in survival beliefs-the di¤erence between the respective average subjective belief and the average objective data-for three waves of the HRS between 2000 and 2004. 4 We observe that relatively "young"-younger than age 65-70-respondents underestimate whereas relatively "old"-above age 70-respondents overestimate their chances to survive into the future. For example, an average 65 year old women underestimates her objective probability to become 80 years by about 20 percentage points. Respondents between ages 85 and 89 in the sample exhibit an average overestimation by about 15 to 20 percentage points. This age-speci…c pattern of subjective survival beliefs is a well-established stylized fact and has been con…rmed by various other studies using di¤erent data sets. Hammermesh (1985) found that subjective survival rate functions are generally ‡atter than their objective counterpart implying underestimation at younger ages and overestimation at older ages. Similar …ndings have been described by Elder (2013) for the US and by Peracchi and Perotti (2010) for European countries using the Survey of Health, Ageing Men Notes: This graph shows deviations in percentage points of subjective survival probabilities from objective data. Objective survival rates are based on cohort life table data. Future objective data is predicted with the Lee-Carter procedure (Lee and Carter 1992) . Each bar depicts the di¤erence of unconditional probabilities to survive to a speci…c target age, cf. and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Wu et al. (2013) highlight a related fact in aggregate data using the 2011 Australian "Retirement Plans and Retirement Incomes: Pilot Survey"which has a richer set of survival questions than the HRS. These data indicate that people of a certain (interview) age underestimate probabilities in the near future whereas they overestimate survival rates for the distant future.
The biases of subjective survival perceptions from objective life-table data shown in Figure 1 are expected to have signi…cant implications for household's consumption and saving decisions. A number of recent studies con…rms this. For example, Salm (2010) estimates that a 1 percent increase in the subjective probability of mortality reduces annual future consumption of non-durable goods by around 1:8 percent. Bloom et al. (2006) …nd that an increased subjective survival probability leads to higher wealth accumulation thereby con…rming results of Hurd et al. (1998) .
Incorporating subjective survival beliefs in structural dynamic household models however requires knowledge of the entire probability distribution while, in general, there are only few data points available. In the HRS, for example, only speci…c unconditional average subjective survival probability for each interview age is observed. A number of recent studies therefore estimate subjective survival beliefs functions by assuming speci…c hazard functions in order to adjust the aggregate di¤erences of subjective data with the objective counterpart, either by a constant "subjective scaling factor"(e.g., Gan et al. 2005) , by assuming distributions of subjective scaling factors (e.g., Bissonnette et al. 2011; Khwaja et al. 2007) , or by allowing the adjustment factor to vary with target age (e.g., Wu et al. 2013) . We add to this literature by using an ambiguity-driven model which has an axiomatic decision theoretic foundation and provides a structural framework to interpret as well as to inter-and extrapolate the data. The next Subsection describes this approach.
Parsimonious Model of Ambiguous Survival Beliefs
The biases in Figure 1 cannot be accommodated by a standard Bayesian learning model where the agent learns more relevant (statistical) information about her future survival chances as she grows older. Such a standard model would imply convergence to the objective probability.
5 To 'explain'the biases in Figure 1 , we follow Ludwig and Zimper (2013) who set up a closed-form model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity within the framework of CEU theory which gives rise to a parsimonious notion of ambiguous survival beliefs.
Technically speaking, this model is based on Choquet decision theory such that survival beliefs are modeled as conditional neo-additive capacities (Chateauneuf et al. 2007) which are updated in accordance with the Generalized Bayesian update rule (Pires 2002; Eichberger et al. 2007 ). Neo-additive capacities are used in the literature 6 to approximate inversely S-shaped probability weighting functions typically elicited for CPT (cf., e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wu and Gonzalez 1996; 1999) . More importantly, in contrast to additive probabilities, the conditional neo-additive survival beliefs constructed in this paper can replicate the patterns of Figure 1 because they do not necessarily converge through Bayesian updating to the objective probabilities. For the reader's bene…t we present a mathematically rigorous review of Choquet decision theory with neo-additive capacities in Appendix A and of the Ludwig and Zimper (2013) learning model in Appendix B. In what follows, we only restate the learning model's parsimonious characterization of ambiguous survival beliefs.
5 This is implied by consistency results for Bayesian estimators. The seminal contribution is Doob (1949) . 6 See, e.g., Wakker (2010) , Abdellaoui et al. (2011), and Zimper (2013) .
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Fix some T h 0 with the interpretation that the agent perceives it as possible to live until the end of period T whereas she perceives it as impossible to live longer than T . Denote by 2 [0; 1] an initial degree of ambiguity and by 2 [0; 1] a psychological bias parameter which measures whether the agent resolves her ambiguity through overor rather through under-estimation of the true probability. The following result is based on Ludwig and Zimper (2013) and derived in some detail in Appendix B 7 :
Proposition 1. Denote the objective probability to survive from k to t by k;t and …x age-independent parameters ; 2 [0; 1]. The h-old agent's age-dependent ambiguous belief to survive from age k to target age t; h k;t ; is given by
for k;t 2 (0; 1) and h k;t = k;t for k;t 2 f0; 1g.
For all k;t 2 (0; 1), the h-old agent's belief to survive from age k to some target age t is thus formally described as an age-dependent weighted average of the objective survival probability with weight 1 h and the psychological bias parameter with weight h . In the absence of ambiguity, i.e., = 0, we have for all h that h k;t = k;t so that all ambiguous survival beliefs reduce to objective survival probabilities and the standard rational expectations approach is nested as a special case. For any positive ambiguity, i.e., > 0, however, the dynamics of the model imply that agents exhibit more pronounced ambiguity attitudes with increasing age. A stylized representation of the model's dynamics is contained in Figure 2 . Interior objective survival rates h 2 (0; 1) are mapped into corresponding subjective survival rates h by a linear transform which is (i) ‡atter than the 45-degree line and (ii) becomes ‡atter with increasing age h. Furthermore, the h -line intersects with the 45-degree line at the relative optimism parameter . Note, that both the underestimation and the overestimation of survival probabilities become more pronounced with higher ambiguity. Increasing ambiguity with 7 In fact, the model used here is a simpli…ed version of the Ludwig and Zimper (2013) model, which merges a standard rational Bayesian learning (RBL) model (with some initial biases in prior beliefs in the additive part of the model) with the model of ambiguous survival beliefs. For sake of simplicity, we here ignore the initial bias in the RBL part so that any bias between objective survival probabilities and subjective beliefs is exclusively ambiguity-driven.
age inherent in our model together with lower objective survival rates for older agents (lower than which is consistent with our empirical estimates, cf. Subection 4.3) implies an increasing importance of overestimation of survival probabilities. Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006) and Halevy (2008) also apply CPT probability weighting functions to survival beliefs. Because these authors use constant (i.e., ageindependent) probability weighting functions, their decision theoretic approach falls under rank dependent utility theory (RDU) (Quiggin 1981; 1982) according to which the additive probability measure (and its Bayesian updates) of a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker is transformed by a …xed weighting function.
The decision theoretic foundation of ambiguous survival beliefs by Proposition 1 goes beyond RDU theory (and beyond probabilistic sophistication) because updating under ambiguity implies the violation of Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle in a Bayesian learning context.
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More precisely, we construct in Appendix 2.3 age-dependentalgebras F h , h = 1; :::; T , which can be interpreted as di¤erent sources of Ellsberg-like uncertainties in the sense of Wakker (2010) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) . Under this interpretation, an agent of …xed age h can be described as an RDU (i.e., a probabilistically sophisticated) decision maker such that the additive probability k;t has been transformed into the neo-additive probability h k;t by an age-speci…c probability weighting function. However, across di¤erent ages, i.e., for di¤erent sources of Ellsberg-like uncertainty, our decision maker is no longer probabilistically sophisticated so that her preferences can no longer be descried by a given probability weighting function as in RDU theory but rather by di¤erent probability weighting functions corresponding to di¤erent ages.
Heuristic Interpretations of Age-increasing h
The Bayesian learning model underlying Proposition 1 assumes that the ‡ow of statistical survival information is a standard …ltration process so that the representative agent receives more information when she grows older. In this environment of Bayesian learning under ambiguity, more information coincides with "ex ante less likely", i.e., "surprising", information to the e¤ect that an ambiguity prone decision maker expresses even more ambiguity in the face of more statistical information. As a formal consequence, ambiguity in survival beliefs, as expressed by the h parameter, increases with age.
Although the age-increasing h is thus a rather mechanical consequence of the underlying decision-theoretic assumptions, this formal feature captures the intuitive notion that, as the objective risk of survival becomes less likely, agents attach less and less weight to this objective probability. According to our estimates of and , presented in Section 4, objective survival probabilities k;t decrease with age to values lower than , cf. in Figure 2 . The model's convergence property hence implies that survival rates are overestimated eventually even when the initial degree of ambiguity, , is low. Overestimation at old age may result from the fact that people have survived the gamble against death several times before. Consequently, one possible heuristic interpretation of age-increasing h might be that "people want to avoid a realistic assessment of their encounter with death".
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The concept of likelihood-insensitivity, introduced by Peter Wakker and coauthors (cf., Wakker 2004; Abdellaoui et al. 2011) , may provide an alternative heuristic interpretation for the age-increasing h of our model. These authors interpret h not as an ambiguity but rather as a cognitive parameter which re ‡ects the empirical observation that people do not su¢ ciently distinguish between non-degenerate probabilities. E.g., an extreme example for likelihood insensitivity are "…fty-…fty" probability assessments for any uncertain event and its complement. Under this cognitive interpretation, likelihood insensitivity-and not necessarily ambiguity-would increase with age. Given that old people increasingly su¤er from cognitive impairments, this alternative interpretation has some intuitive appeal. Despite this, we continue to interpret h as age-dependent ambiguity in the remainder of our analysis.
Regardless of the speci…c interpretation, we can conclude, at this point, that (i) Proposition 1 is derived from sound (albeit strong) decision-theoretic assumptions and (ii) the calibration of our parsimonious belief model will result in a nice …t to the HRS data on subjective survival beliefs (cf. Section 5.1).
Quantitative Life-Cycle Model
This section merges our notion of ambiguous survival beliefs with a life-cycle model where one period corresponds to one age year. Households live up to some maximum age, T . We also model a realistic life-cycle income pro…le including stochastic and agespeci…c labor productivity. In addition, a PAYG pension system is modeled assuming a …xed date of retirement. We assume no annuity markets and a borrowing constraint. These elements are included only in order to generate realistic endogenous life-cycle consumption pro…les. Borrowing constraints, stochastic labor income in combination with impatience gives a hump-shaped consumption pro…le as we see it in the data. Positive pension income implies that savings for retirement are not too large.
Demographics
We consider a large number of ex-ante identical agents (=households). Households become economically active at age (or period) 0 and live at most until age T . The number of households of age t is denoted by N t . Population is stationary and we normalize total population to unity, i.e., P T t=0 N t = 1. Households work full time during periods 1; : : : ; t r 1 and are retired thereafter. The working population is P tr 1 t=0 N t and the retired population is P T t=tr N t . We refer to age h t as the planning age of the household, i.e., the age when households make their consumption and saving plans for the future. At ages h = 1; : : : ; T , households face objective risk to survive to some future period t. We denote corresponding objective survival probabilities for all in-between periods k, h k < t, by k;t where k;t 1 for all t T and k;t = 0 for t = T + 1. We think of survival risk as an idiosyncratic risk which washes out at the aggregate level. Total population is therefore constant and dynamics of the population are correspondingly given by N t+1 = t;t+1 N t , for N 0 given.
Endowments
There are discrete shocks to labor productivity in every period t = 0; 1; :::; ; t r 1 denoted by t 2 E, E …nite, which are i.i.d. across households of the same age. The reason for stochastic labor productivity in our model is to impose discipline on calibration. For sake of comparability, our fully rational model features standard elements as used in numerous structural empirical studies (cf., Laibson et al. 1998; Gourinchas and Parker 2002 and references therein) . By t = ( 1 ; : : : ; t ) we denote a history of shocks and t j h with h t is the history ( 1 ; : : : ; h ; :::; t ). Let E be the powerset of the …nite set E and E tr 1 be the -algebra generated by E; E; :::. We assume that there is an objective probability space
In addition, we assume productivity to vary by age where t denotes age-speci…c productivity which will be estimated from the data and results in a hump-shaped life cycle earnings pro…le.
After retirement at age t r households receive a lump-sum pension income, b. Retirement income is modeled in order to achieve a realistic calibration. Pension contributions are levied at contribution rate .
Collecting elements, income of a household of age t is given by
There are no annuity markets, an assumption which can be justi…ed by the observed small size of private annuity markets. 10 We assume a …xed zero borrowing constraint and a …xed interest rate r. With cash-on-hand given as x t a t (1 + r) + y t the budget constraint writes as
De…ne total income as y tot t = y t + ra t , saving as s t = y tot t c t and gross savings as assets tomorrow, a t+1 :
Government
We assume a pure PAYG public social security system. Denote by the net pension bene…t level, i.e., the ratio of pensions to net wages. The government budget is assumed to be balanced each period and is given by
In addition, accidental bequests-arising because of missing annuity markets-are taxed away at a con…scatory rate of 100%. 
CEU Preferences
Households face two dimensions of uncertainty, respectively risk, about period t consumption. First, due to our assumption of productivity shocks, agents face a risky labor income. Second, agents are uncertain with respect to their life expectancy. While we model income risk in the standard objective EU way, we model uncertainty about lifeexpectancy in terms of a CEU agent who holds ambiguous survival beliefs as stated in Proposition 1.
Given the productivity shock history h , denote by c (c h ; c h+1 ; c h+2 :::) a shockcontingent consumption plan such that the functions c t , for t = h; h + 1; :::, assign to every history of shocks t j h some amount of period t consumption. Denote by u (c t ) the agent's utility from consumption at age t. We assume that utility is strictly increasing in consumption and that the agent is strictly risk-averse, i.e., u 0 (c t ) > 0, u 00 (c t ) < 0.
Expected utility of an h-old agent from consumption in period t > h contingent on the observed history of productivity shocks h is then given as
. 12 For any s 2 fh; h + 1; :::; T g and survival until period s, the agent's von Neumann Morgenstern utility (vNM) from a consumption plan c is then de…ned as
To model survival uncertainty of an agent of age h with respect to ambiguous survival beliefs, we use the sequence of conditional neo-additive probability spaces ( ; F; ( j h)), h = 1; :::; T , which is mathematically rigorously constructed in Appendix B.3. Denote by h ( j h) the agent's age-conditional neo-additive capacity and by s = ( ) the objective probability to survive until age s.
In order to formalize utility maximization over life-time consumption with respect to neo-additive probability measures, we henceforth describe an h-old agent as a CEU decision maker who maximizes her Choquet expected utility from life-time consumption with respect to h . By Observation A.1 in Appendix A.1, this agent's CEU from consumption plan c with respect to h is given as
The Choquet expected value of a lifetime utility U (c) with respect to a neo-additive capacity h is a convex combination of the expected value of U with respect to some additive probability measure s and an ambiguity part. In case there is some ambiguity, i.e., > 0, parameter measures how much weight the decision maker puts on the least upper bound of the range of U: Conversely, (1 ) is the weight she puts on the greatest lower bound. For these bounds we have for any c that sup s2fh;h+1;:::g
i.e., the least upper bound consists of the discounted sum of utilities if survival where one in every period while the greatest lower bound in this setting is utility if the agent does not survive to the following period.
Proposition 2. Consider an agent of age h. The agent's Choquet expected utility from consumption plan c is given by
where the subjective belief to survive from age h to t h is given by
Proof. Fix age h and consider the neo-additive probability space ( ; F; ( j h)) constructed in Appendix B.3. The objective probability to survive until period t is given as
where D t denotes the event that the agent dies at the end of period t. Consequently, (2) can be equivalently rewritten as
which, together with Proposition 1, proves the proposition.
Recursive Problem and Dynamic Inconsistency
In contrast to a sequence of conditional additive probability spaces ( ; F; ( j h)), h = 1; :::; T , our age-dependent sequence of conditional neo-additive probability spaces ( ; F; ( j h)), h = 1; :::; T , (generically) violates dynamic consistency of the agents'lifecycle utility maximization problem whenever > 0. 13 To characterize actual behavior 13 We refer the interested reader to the axiomatic treatment of the relationship between violations of dynamic consistency and violations of Savage's (1954) in the presence of dynamic inconsistency, it is convenient to work with the recursive representation of the planning problem under the, arguably, realistic assumption of naive agents. That is, we consider dynamically inconsistent agents who are naive in the sense that they wrongly assume that their optimal consumption plan for any given future-self coincides with this future-self's actual consumption choice. We further assume that income risk is …rst-order Markov such that ( t j t 1 ) = ( t j t ). It is then straightforward to set up the recursive formulation of lifetime utility (3) for a naive agent. The value function of age t h viewed from planning age h is given by
The naive CEU agent's …rst order condition is then given by the standard Euler equations.
Proposition 3. The consumption plan c = (c h ; c h+1 ; :::) of a naive CEU agent must satisfy, for all t h,
which holds with equality if we have for future asset holdings a t+1 > 0.
By (4), the expected growth of marginal utility from h to h + 1 is higher than under rational expectations if the household underestimates the probability of survival to the next period, i.e., if h h;h+1 < h;h+1 , and vice versa for overestimation. From the Euler equations (4) we can also directly verify that the CEU life-cycle maximization problem is dynamically inconsistent if and only if the ambiguous survival beliefs do not reduce to additive probabilities. To see this let us compare the optimal consumption choice of an h + 1 old agent, …rst, from the perspective of an h old and, second, from her actual perspective when she turns h + 1. By Proposition 3, the optimal consumption plan for age h + 1 from the perspective of age h requires (for positive asset holdings) that du
whereas the optimal consumption choice at age h + 1 from the perspective of age h + 1 requires that du dc h+1 = (1 + r) h+1 h+1;h+2 h+1 h+1;h+1
16 Dynamic consistency with respect to the optimal consumption choice at age h + 1 thus holds if and only if the two …rst order conditions (5) and (6) 
As in the static CPT model of Halevy (2008) , the CEU life-cycle maximization problem considered in this paper is thus dynamically inconsistent whenever the agents do not reduce to standard RE agents. Whereas dynamic inconsistency in Halevy (2008) results from a …xed non-additive probability weighting function, dynamically inconsistency in our model comes with a sequence of non-additive probability weighting functions.
Aggregation over Households
Wealth dispersion within each age bin is only driven by productivity shocks. We denote the cross-sectional measure of agents with characteristics (a t ; t ) by t (a t ; t ). Denote by A = [0; 1] the set of all possible asset holdings and let E be the set of all possible income realizations. De…ne by P (E) the power set of E and by B (A) the Borel -algebra of A: Let Y be the Cartesian product Y = A E and M = (B (A)) : The measures t ( ) are elements of M. We denote the Markov transition function-telling us how people with characteristics (t; a t ; t ) move to period t + 1 with characteristics t + 1; a t+1 ; t+1 -by Q t (a t ; t ). The cross-sectional measure evolves according to
and for newborns
The Markov transition function Q t ( ) is given by Q t ((a t ; t ) ; A E) = 
Objective Cohort Data
For objective survival rates we estimate cohort speci…c survival rates for US cohorts alive in 2007. Objective cross-sectional data is taken from the Social Security Administration (SSA) for 1890 1933 and the Human Mortality Database (HMD) for the years 1934 2007. To obtain complete cohort tables, future survival rates are predicted by the Lee and Carter (1992) procedure. Details are described in Ludwig and Zimper (2013) . Since data on survival rates is unreliable for ages past 100 we estimate survival rates assuming the Gompertz-Makeham law.
14 Accordingly, the mortality rate t at age t is assumed to follow
We estimate parameters f i g 3 i=1 to get an out of sample prediction for ages past 100: The resulting predicted mortality rate function …ts actual data very well and is used as objective cohort data in the simulation. According to our estimates, the average mortality rate approaches 1 at ages around age 110 (t = 90). For all ages t = 91; : : : ; 105, we set the objective survival rate to t;t+1 = " = 0:01.
Estimated Subjective Survival Beliefs
We follow Ludwig and Zimper (2013) and estimate parameters h=0 and using a non-linear root…nder to best match the HRS data. Subjective survival rates are obtained by pooling a sample of HRS waves f2000; 2002; 2004g. Except for heterogeneity in sex and age, we ignore all other heterogeneity across individuals. The estimation yields = 0:118 and = 0:406. 
Preferences
We assume a CRRA per-period utility function with 6 = 1 given by
for all t with preference shifter 0. The preference shifter ensures that utility of survival is always higher than utility from death, which is normalized as zero. As a benchmark, we choose = 3:0-corresponding to an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of one third-and consider as range for sensitivity analysis 2 f2; 4g.
Given > 1, per period utility is negative and we therefore calibrate the preference shifter such that condition
holds for all t;
t . We set = 76:7 for the naive CEU agent which turns out to be su¢ ciently high. 16 We further set the discount rate to 5%.
Prices and Endowments
Wages are normalized to w = 1. We consider a symmetric two-state …rst-order Markov chain for the income process in periods t = 0; Age speci…c productivity f t g of wages is estimated based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) applying the method developed in Hugget et al. (2007) . The interest rate is set to r = 0:042 based on Siegel (2002) . For the social security contribution rate we take the US contribution rate of = 0:124: The pension bene…t level then follows from the social security budget constraint, cf. equation (1).
All parameters are summarized in Table 2 .
Results
Ambiguous versus Rational Survival Beliefs
Figure 3 compares predicted subjective survival rates resulting from our model of ambiguous survival beliefs with their empirical counterparts and corresponding objective survival rates. Jumps in the …gure are due to changes in interview age and respective target age in the survey. Predicted subjective beliefs …t data on subjective survival probabilities well. In particular, the model replicates underestimation of survival rates at younger ages and overestimation at older ages. O bjec tive P r obabil ity S ubjec tive B elief
Notes: Unconditional objective and subjective probabilities viewed from di¤erent planning ages h:
Target age is depicted on the abscissa.
from di¤erent planning ages where target age t is depicted on the abscissa. Within each of the panels experience, and therefore the ambiguity parameter, does not change. In line with Hammermesh (1985) , Peracchi and Perotti (2010), Elder (2013) and several others, subjective survival beliefs generally result in a ‡atter line than their objective counterparts. Furthermore, notice that our ambiguous survival beliefs match the stylized fact described by Wu et al. (2013) : People at a speci…c planning (or interview) age underestimate their chances of survival to the nearer future and overestimate the survival probabilities to the more distant future. Also, comparing the di¤erent panels in Figure 4 we observe that overestimation of survival probabilities becomes more pronounced as the agent gets older. For example, at age 85 there is underestimation of survival until age 92 while survival to later target ages are overestimated.
We conclude that our calibrated model of ambiguous survival beliefs replicates well the stylized features of the survival belief biases reported in the HRS.
Life-Cycle Pro…les with Ambiguous Beliefs
This subsection compares average plans and realized actions of naive CEU agents. These agents update their plans in each period. As a way to compare any gap between plans made at age h and realizations in t h for CEU agents we denote planned average consumption with superscripts and computẽ
for all t. This gives us hypothetical average consumption pro…les in the population if households would stick to their respective period-h plans in all periods t = h; : : : ; T . Observe that h t ( ) is an arti…cial distribution generated by respective plans of households. We refer to equation (7) as (average) "planned" consumption (asset, ...) pro…le in the …gures that follow. By dynamic consistency, we have for RE agents that
for all h = 1; : : : ; T . These equalities do not hold for naive CEU agents. Figure 5 compares these objects for naive CEU agents. We compute average consumption,c 18 In our calibration we have impatient consumers with > r implying a downward-sloping consumption pro…le in the retirement period. In the rational expectations model the consumption growth rate reduces more and more as people grow older because of decreasing survival rates. Meanwhile, the CRRA utility function implies consumers to be prudent so that they will save for precautionary motives to self-insure against future income ‡uc-tuations. The assumption of a borrowing constraint results in an additional-institutionrather than preference-based-motive for precautionary savings of households to avoid the future potential of binding borrowing constraint. As agents age, motives for precautionary saving become less and less strong and binding constraints less relevant. For these reasons, consumption is initially upward sloping until retirement where the precautionary savings motives are gone. Consequently, the saving rate is positive throughout working life while the agents dissave during retirement. This in turn is re ‡ected in the accumulated assets which rise during working age and peak around retirement entry. Finally, the marginal propensity to consume out of cash-on-hand (MPC) is u-shaped. This results from the interplay of two e¤ects: holding cash-on-hand constant the marginal propensity is low for younger agents and converges to one for older agents, due to their shorter remaining lifetime. For any given age, the marginal propensity decreases with cash-on-hand from values close to one for agents with only little wealth to much lower values for agents with higher cash-on-hand values. As cash-on-hand is low at the beginning of the life-cycle, these e¤ects taken together result in a u-shaped pro…le.
Comparing the plan and the realization we observe that, initially, CEU agents plan to save more and consume less during working life which would result in higher assets. The planned average saving rate of 20 year old CEU agents is 24:7 percent, whereas the realized saving rate is 21:9 percent. We can thus replicate empirical …ndings reviewed above that people save less than originally planned, cf. Choi et al. (2006) .
Note also that the planned and realized MPC of CEU agents diverge at older ages. This results from increasing overestimation of survival probabilities which implies large planned old-age asset holdings.
Life-Cycle Pro…les in Rational Baseline Calibration
To highlight the e¤ects of modeling subjective survival beliefs on life-cycle pro…les of consumption, saving and asset holdings we compare in Figure 6 naive CEU agents with RE agents who use objective survival data.
19 On average, CEU agents exhibit undersaving during early working life until age 57 relative to RE agents. Naive CEU agents …rst consume more than RE agents but start to consume less at age 46 leading to higher saving at age 58 and higher asset holdings later in life. The subjective survival belief model thus gives rise to undersaving at younger ages-due to an underestimation of future survival-and to higher asset holdings at older ages-due to an overestimation of the survival rate at older ages. Correspondingly, the marginal propensity to consume is higher for CEU than for RE agents at younger ages whereas the converse is true at older ages. 
MPC
RE agents
Naive CEU agents Notes: Average life-cycle pro…le of naive CEU agents compared to RE agents. MPC denotes the marginal propensity to consume out of cash-on-hand which is approximated by by computing averages of c= x from the associated policy functions. Table 3 comprises these results by reporting summary statistics. The average saving rate 20 of CEU agents during their working life is roughly one percentage point lower than the average saving rate of RE agents. More strikingly, average asset holdings of the elderly of ages 85+ are very di¤erent between the two types. For CEU agents assets 19 In this comparison across models we hold the raw discount rate constant. We treat as a deep structural model parameter which is identi…ed by the use of one speci…c model and calibrated here by reference to our studies. This justi…es holding it constant when analyzing counterfactual models. 20 The saving rate is de…ned as the ratio of average savings to average income. 52:2% 106:9% 1) We de…ne the "average" saving rate as the ratio of averages during working life. We hence compute
2) Assets of age 85 (95) relative to assets at retirement entry.
3) Percentage di¤erence of average assets during ages 85-110 relative to average assets through whole life.
of the elderly are roughly 107 percent of average assets. On the contrary, for RE agents, average asset holdings of the elderly are only 52 percent of average assets. Assets of an agent at age 85 (95) relative to her assets at retirement entry are still 46:9% (23:9%) while these values are much lower for RE agents, especially at very old ages. To make our results comparable to the empirical evidence reported by Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) , Table 3 also reports numbers on median asset holdings. According to Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) , median wealth paths for single households in the HRS indicate that households at age 85 (90) still hold around 49 (21) percent of their assets of age 65. This corresponds to a decumulation speed of 3:2 for CEU agents which is substantially closer to the empirical Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) benchmark of 2:3. Consequently, ambiguous survival beliefs-resulting in overestimation at old ages-have to be considered as one additional cause for the high old-age asset holdings besides the existing explanations in the form of bequest and precautionary savings motives (De Nardi et al. 2010; Lockwood 2013) .
Trade-o¤ Between Matching Both Empirical Facts
The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES)-the inverse of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion -in ‡uences the willingness to smooth consumption over time. Increasing the IES leads to more consumption at younger ages and to a higher degree of undersaving by the CEU agent. This results in less asset accumulation. In contrast, high old-age asset holdings of CEU agents is less pronounced when the intertemporal substi-tution elasticity is high. Thus, the choice of the IES determines whether undersaving or high old-age asset holdings is predominant. Table 4 shows the saving rate and asset holdings for di¤erent values of the IES by setting 2 f2; 4g. In case of a high IES ( = 2), undersaving by CEU agents increases to 3:3 percentage points. At the same time the di¤erence of average asset holdings of the elderly between CEU and RE are less pronounced. Nevertheless, CEU agents have on average roughly 8:6 percentage points higher relative average assets at old age than RE agents. A lower elasticity ( = 4) leads to very pronounced high asset holdings of elderly CEU agents which are 77:2 percentage points higher than for average RE agents. The undersaving e¤ect almost vanishes, though. With = 4, assets of a 85 (95) year CEU agent relative to the assets at age 65 are at 57:7 (36:5) percent. CEU median asset holdings at age 85 relative to age 65 are 51:7 percent and close to the empirical point estimate of 49 percent, cf. Hurd and Rohwedder (2010 
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies implications of ambiguous survival beliefs for consumption and saving behavior. Point of departure of our analysis is that people make mistakes in assessing their chances to survive into the future: "young"people tend to underestimate whereas 21 The corresponding median RE decumulation speed is 35:9 9:1 3:94 which again is far o¤ the empirical benchmark.
"old" people tend to overestimate their survival probabilities. We adopt and parametrize a model of Bayesian learning of ambiguous survival beliefs which replicates these patterns. The resulting conditional neo-additive survival beliefs are merged into a stochastic life-cycle model with CEU (=Choquet expected utility) agents to study life cycle consequences compared to agents with rational expectations (RE).
We show that agents of our model behave dynamically inconsistent. As a result (naive) CEU agents save less at younger ages than they actually planned to save. Due to underestimation of survival at young age, CEU agents also save less than RE agents. Despite this tendency to undersave, CEU agents eventually have higher asset holdings after retirement because of the overestimation of survival probabilities in old age. Overall, our model of mistakes in the assessment of survival prospects adds to explanations for three empirical …ndings: (i) time inconsistency of agents, (ii) undersaving at younger ages and (iii) high asset holdings at old age. Hence, our model hits at-but does not kill-"three birds with one stone".
Our work gives rise to several avenues of future research. First, observe that the ambiguous survival survival belief functions depicted in Figure 4 closely resemble quasihyperbolic time discounting functions, cf., e.g., Laibson (1997) . Our ongoing current research compares the qualitative and quantitative features of our ambiguous survival beliefs model with models of hyperbolic time discounting. Of particular interest is the close theoretical (Saito 2011) and empirical (Epper et al. 2011 ) relationship between the concepts of CPT/CEU and hyperbolic time discounting. Second, we plan to combine our notion of CEU agents with hyperbolic time discounting and/or with bequest and precautionary savings motives in order to cover important aspects of life-cycle decisions. The main challenge for this generalizing approach will be to come up with a parsimonious model in which all calibrated behavioral parameters are identi…ed. Third, we plan to come back in future research to the question of whether "minimizing one's encounter with death" or "age-increasing likelihood insensitivity" (or a combination of both e¤ects) is the better heuristic interpretation for our model's formal feature of an age-increasing h . Finally, we will extend our framework to address normative questions on the optimal design of the tax and transfer system, similar to Laibson et al. (1998) , Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and, more recently, Yazici (2012, 2013) in the hyperbolic time discounting literature.
A Appendix: Choquet Decision Theory
A.1 Choquet Integration and Neo-additive Capacities
Consider a measurable space ( ; F) with F denoting a -algebra on the state space and a non-additive probability measure (=capacity) : F ! [0; 1] satisfying (i) (;) = 0, ( ) = 1 (ii) A B ) (A) (B) for all A; B 2 F: The Choquet integral of a bounded F-measurable function f : ! R with respect to capacity is de…ned as the following Riemann integral extended to domain (Schmeidler 1986 ):
For example, assume that f takes on m di¤erent values such that A 1 ; :::; A m is the unique partition of with f (! 1 ) > ::: > f (! m ) for ! i 2 A i . Then the Choquet expectation (8) becomes
This paper focuses on non-additive probability measures that are de…ned as neoadditive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) . Recall that the set of null events, denoted N , collects all events that the decision maker deems impossible. De…nition 1. Fix some set of null-events N F for the measurable space ( ; F). The neo-additive capacity, , is de…ned, for some ; 2 [0; 1] by
for all A 2 F such that is some additive probability measure satisfying
and the non-additive probability measure is de…ned as follows
In this paper, we are exclusively concerned with the empty set as the only null event, i.e., N = f;g. In this case, the neo-additive capacity in (9) simpli…es to
for all A 6 = ;; . The following observation extends a result (Lemma 3.1) of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) for …nite random variables to the more general case of random variables with a bounded range (see Zimper 2012 for a formal proof).
Observation 1. Let f : ! R be an F-measurable function with bounded range. The Choquet expected value (8) of f with respect to a neo-additive capacity (9) is then given by
A.2 The Generalized Bayesian Update Rule
CEU theory has been developed in order to accommodate paradoxes of the Ellsberg (1961) type which show that real-life decision-makers violate Savage's (1954) sure thing principle. Abandoning the sure thing principle has two important implications for conditional CEU preferences. First, in contrast to Bayesian updating of additive probability measures, there exist several perceivable Bayesian update rules for non-additive probability measures (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Pires 2002; Eichberger et al. 2007; Siniscalchi 2011) . Second, if CEU preferences are updated in accordance with an updating rule that universally satis…es the principle of consequentialism, then these CEU preferences violate the principle of dynamic consistency (in a universal sense) whenever they do not reduce to EU preferences (cf. Epstein and Le Breton 1993; Ghirardato 2002; Zimper 2012 and references therein) .
In the present paper we assume that the agents form conditional capacities in accordance with the Generalized Bayesian update rule such that, for all non-null A; B 2 F,
An application of (10) to a neo-additive capacity gives rise to the following observation.
Observation 2. If the Generalized Bayesian update rule (10) is applied to a neoadditive capacity (9), we obtain, for all non-null A; B 2 F;
such that
B Appendix: Bayesian Learning of Ambiguous Survival Beliefs
This appendix derives Proposition 1 and it constructs the neo-additive probability spaces which we use when we de…ne the life-cycle CEU maximization problem in Section 3.4. To this purpose, let us brie ‡y recall the learning model of ambiguous survival beliefs as introduced in Ludwig and Zimper (2013) . We consider an h-old agent, with 0 h k, who observes the random sample informationĨ n(h) which counts how many individuals out of a sample of size n (h) have survived from age k to t with k < t. By assumption, these individuals have the same i.i.d. objective survival probability as the agent.
B.1 The Benchmark Case of Additive Survival Beliefs
At …rst, consider a standard Bayesian decision maker whose additive estimator for the chance of surviving from k to t conditional onĨ n(h) is de…ned as the conditional expected value E h~ ; ~ jĨ n(h) i where the random variable~ stands for the agent's survival chance with support on (0; 1). By the i.i.d. assumption of individual survivals,Ĩ n(h) is, conditional on the true survival probability~ = , binomially distributed with probabilities
n j for j 2 f0; :::; n (h)g .
We further assume that the agent's prior over~ is given as a Beta distribution with parameters ; > 0, implying E h~
That is, we assume that
is a normalizing constant. By Bayes'rule we obtain the following conditional distribution of~
Note that ~ jĨ n(h) = j is itself a Beta distribution with parameters +j; +n (h) j.
The agent's subjective survival belief conditional on informationĨ n(h) = j is thus given as
for j 2 f0; :::; n (h)g :
That is, the posterior estimator E h~ ; ~ jĨ n(h) i is a weighted average of her prior survival probability E h~ ; ~ i , not including any sample information, and the observed sample mean j n(h) .
B.2 Ambiguous Survival Beliefs
Turn now to a Choquet decision maker with neo-additive capacity
It remains to provide a mathematically rigorous translation of the notion of ambiguous survival beliefs h k;t of Proposition 1 into the construction of the conditional neo-additive probability spaces ; F h ; ( j h) , h = 1; :::; T , that are relevant to the CEU life-cycle maximization problem of Section 3.4. To this purpose de…ne the …nite state space = f0; 1; :::; T g and denote by F the powerset of . We interpret D t = ftg , t 2 as the event in F that the agent dies at the end of period t. De…ne age h of the agent as the following event in
Further, formally de…ne Z k;t = D t [ ::: [ D T as the event in F that the agent survives from period k to the beginning of period t.
For each age h, the -algebra F h is generated by the following partition of : ff0g ; ::; fh 1g ; fh; :::; T gg. That is, if the agent turns age h she (trivially) observes that she has not died in any previous period but will die at the end of either period h or h + 1 or ... or T . Observe that our de…nition of F h implies a standard information …ltration process because of F 1 :::
To conclude the construction of ; F h ; ( j h) , h = 1; :::; T , de…ne (Z k;t j h) h k;t such that h k;t is given by Proposition 1.
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C Supplementary Appendix: A Three-Period Model
The intuition of how ambiguous survival beliefs a¤ect consumption and saving behavior will be given in a simple three-period model (T = 2) which can be solved analytically. In this simple model we abstract from borrowing constraints, hence a t+1 < 0, t < T is possible. The no-Ponzi condition a T +1 0 is of course assumed. To simplify the analysis we assume the discount factor to be one and an interest rate r of zero.
As shown in Section 3, lifetime utility for T = 2 with ambiguous survival beliefs is expressed as where h k;t is the subjective survival belief from Proposition 1. Recall that superscripts denote the respective planning age.
We normalize the utility from death to zero. Lifetime utility of CEU agents reduces to the standard rational expectations case if and only if there is no initial ambiguity, i.e., if = 0. As in Section 3 we assume a CRRA per-period utility function with preference shifter 0. We de…ne by x t a t + y t cash-on-hand as the sum of …nancial assets a t and income y t : In addition, de…ne the present value of future income, h t P T s=t+1 y s ; as human wealth. Finally, let total wealth be w t x t + h t : The budget constraint is then given by
In light of the data on subjective beliefs displayed in Figure 1 of the paper we interpret period 0 of the simple model as the period when survival probabilities are underestimated, i.e., up to actual age of about 65 70. Period 1 then re ‡ects the period when there is overestimation in the data. Correspondingly, we make the following assumption: 
i.e., that < 0;1 as well as 
i.e., that > 1;2 .
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Analysis of Consumption and Saving plans
We now turn to the complete inter-temporal household solution to analyze how consumption and saving decisions are altered by biases in subjective survival beliefs.
Rational Expectations
The reference model is the standard solution to the rational expectations model (where 0 = 1 = 0). Here, lifetime utility does not depend on the planing period, i.e., U Proof. See, e.g., Deaton (1992) .
CEU Households
To draw a distinction between RE and CEU households, we use superscript n to denote policy functions (in terms of marginal propensities to consume) of naive CEU households. Given that the household consumes all outstanding wealth in the …nal period 2 (i.e. m n 2 = 1) the solution of the household's problem for all other periods are as follows: This is so because 0 < 1 and therefore less weight is put on the relative optimism parameter .
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The plan in period 0 for period 1 is: We proceed by introducing two de…nitions which will be used to interpret the above policy functions.
De…nition 2 (Moderate Overestimation). A household moderately overestimates planned unconditional survival beliefs if At age 0 the realized marginal propensity of the CEU agent, m 0;n 0 ; is higher than for an agent with rational expectations, m 0 . This outcome only holds under the condition of su¢ cient underestimation of De…nition 3. The result implies undersaving, i.e., the naive CEU household saves less out of initial wealth in period 0 than the RE agent.
Turning to the plan of self 0 for the next period 1, observe that the marginal propensity to consume in period 1 planned in period 0, m 0;n 1 ; is lower than the realized marginal propensity, m 1;n 1 : Again, this outcome only holds under a certain condition, which is labeled as moderate overestimation, cf. De…nition 2. That is, only if overestimation is not too large, we can expect model households to save less than originally planned.
Finally, the realized marginal propensity of the CEU agent at age 1; m 1;n 1 ; is lower than for the RE agent, m 1 : In period 1; the CEU household saves more out of accumulated wealth relative to the RE household. Nevertheless, accumulated wealth is an endogenous object. While it is clear that accumulated wealth of the naive CEU household in period 0 is lower than for an agent with rational expectations, relative wealth positions across the two households in period 1 depend on the relative strength of suf…cient underestimation in period 0 vis-a-vis overestimation in period 1. It is therefore ultimately a quantitative question whether accumulated wealth in period 2 of CEU households exceeds wealth of households with rational expectations.
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The analysis of the simple model clari…es that it is a quantitative question whether the calibrated life-cycle model can generate the three empirical regularities on saving behavior: (i) time inconsistent behavior to the e¤ect that people save less than originally planned (under "moderate overestimation"); (ii) undersaving at young age (under "su¢ cient underestimation"); (iii) high old age asset holdings (if the overestimation eventually outweighs initially low asset accumulation due to the underestimation).
